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Abstract 
This thesis examines party institutionalization in East Europe. Ethnicity, electoral 
systems and economics are variables explored in the substantive chapters. Many political 
science studies examine the number of parties in East Europe, but only a few studies 
study party institutionalization. Chapter 1 establishes the foundations for this thesis and 
provides an overview of each chapter. 
In the second chapter, I analyze the relationship between institutionalized parties and 
ethnicity. Kitschelt (1992) argues that in the absence of institutionalized parties, voters 
look to other factors, such as ethnicity, when voting. The results from this chapter report 
that ethnicity plays a limited role in party institutionalization. The most surprising 
finding from this chapter is the significant relationship between the presence of an 
official state language and the number of institutionalized parties. For future research, I 
would like to develop and ethnicity index which would measure the distribution of ethnic 
groups within a country. I believe an ethnicity index would substantially improve the 
results in this chapter. 
Electoral systems have received considerable attention from political scientists. 
Many studies focus on the relationship between electoral systems and the number of 
parties in a country. This chapter, however, examines the influence of electoral systems 
on the number of institutionalized parties in East Europe. In general, the results from 
chapter 3 provide no empirical support for the impact electoral systems have on party 
institutionalization. To improve the validity of this study, I believe additional elections 
could add salience to studies in this area. 
Chapter 4 explores the effect economics has on institutionalized parties. In early 
elections, my results indicate an insignificant relationship between economic 
performance and party institutionalization. For the final two elections, my results show 
that economic variables influence party institutionalization. Gross national income (GNI) 
per capita was positive in the final two tests, and the results reveal a positive relationship 
between this variable and the number of institutionalized parties. Central government 
debt and gross domestic product (GDP) growth were also statistically significant in the 
final test. In sum, the findings in this thesis suggest that economics are the most salient 
factor for party institutionalization in East Europe. 
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Chapter 1 
Party Institutionalization and Ethnicity 
Introduction 
Over the last decade, there has been considerable debate on democratization 
efforts in East Europe. Parties are an integral part of established democracies and 
provide cues to voters in democratic countries. A number of studies have focused on 
parties in post-communist countries (Taagepera and Shugart 1993; Kitschelt 1992 and 
Bielasik 2001). Research on party institutionalization in post-communist countries, 
however, is much more limited (Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994 and Moser 1999). Party 
institutionalization is the focus of this thesis, and subsequent chapters will examine 
specific aspects related to party institutionalization in East European countries. For the 
purposes of this study, party institutionalization refers to any party that has maintained 
parliamentary representation in consecutive elections. This approach is similar to the one 
used by Ordeshook and Shvetsova (1994). In order to gauge the degree of East European 
party institutionalization, the second chapter examines the relationship between ethnicity 
and institutionalized parties. In chapter three, I explore the relationship between electoral 
systems and party institutionalization. Chapter four examines the relationship between 
economic strength and party institutionalization. The final chapter summarizes my 
findings and offers some final thoughts for studies on party institutionalization. 
Significance of this Research 
While much of the post-communist literature has focused on parties in post-
communist countries, little research has been conducted on institutionalized parties. 
Many have focused on the constraining effects of various variables on party development 
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more broadly. Some scholars focus on the constraining effects of ethnicity (Kitschelt 
1992; Kolst and Tsilevich 1997 and Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994) while others study 
the impact of electoral laws on party development (Coppedge 1997; Cox 1997; Lijphart 
1994; Moser 1999 and Taagepera and Shugart 1993). Others examine the impact of 
economic variables on democratization efforts (Aguilar and Pacek 2000; Hamann 2000; 
Harper 2000; and Pacek 1994). These studies, and much of the rest of literature dealing 
with party development, examine how variables either increase or decrease the number of 
parties in a country. Many studies on parties in post-communist countries deal with the 
number of parties in a system rather than the number of institutionalized parties. This 
thesis, however, is more concerned with the number of institutionalized parties. 
The number of institutionalized parties can be fairly easy to determine, and has 
been the focus of only a few studies. Much of the research that deals with the number of 
political parties in post-communist countries simply looks at the number of parties in 
these countries. Many political scientists have focused on political parties in East Europe 
(Kitschelt 1992; Pacek 1994; Coppedge 1997; Cox 1997; Orenstein 1998; Moser 1999; 
Taagepera 1999; Fidrmuc 2000 and Harper 2000), but only a few scholars have explored 
the presence of institutionalized parties (Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994 and Moser 
1999). The term institutionalized refers to parties that have gained representation in 
consecutive elections. While the number of parties in parliament represents the number 
of parties in an election, I believe that one of the primary features of established 
democracies are institutionalized parties. This study is unique in that the focus here is on 
the number of institutionalized parties, rather than just the number of parties represented 
in a parliament. 
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Hypotheses 
There are several hypotheses that I test in the following chapters. In the second 
chapter, I assess the relationship between ethnicity and party development. Every 
country in this study has been democratic for only a short period. In the initial 
democratic elections, parties existed but not in the same manner that parties exist in West 
Europe or the United States. These parties were all new and except for the former 
communist parties, based on various issues. Parties in East Europe are less stable and do 
not have the historical legacies that parties in more developed democracies possess. 
K.itschelt ( 1992) argues that in the absence of clear party labels, voters will use other 
factors, such as ethnicity, when voting. Thus, I would expect societies that are more 
heterogeneous to have more parties represented in the initial election. Additionally, I 
expect more homogeneous societies (e.g., Poland) to have no parties based on ethnic 
cleavages. I hypothesize that while ethnicity might play an influential role in the first 
election, in a heterogeneous society ethnicity will be less influential in subsequent 
elections. 
Chapter three centers on the relationship of electoral laws on party development. 
Several authors believe that electoral laws and their mechanical effects influence the 
number of parties represented in parliament (Duverger 1954; Cox 1997; Taagepera and 
Shugart 1989 and Coppedge 1997). Mechanical effects refer to the impact certain 
features (e.g., legal thresholds, district magnitude, and assembly size) have on the number 
of parties in parliament. For the purposes of this study, legal threshold refers to the 
amount (percentage) of votes necessary to gain parliamentary representation. District 
magnitude is the number of seats in an electoral district. The assembly size is simply the 
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number of seats in parliament. These variables are elaborated in chapter three, and are 
used to examine the effect electoral systems have on party development. For example, 
low legal thresholds, high district magnitude, and larger assembly size can all increase 
the number of parties represented in a parliament. Legal thresholds, district magnitude 
and the size of the parliament (or what Shugart and Carey refer to as "assembly size") 
are all used in this chapter. Countries that combine proportional representation (PR) 
systems and single member districts have mixed member systems. Two countries in this 
chapter use mixed member district systems (e.g. Hungary and Lithuania). In PR systems, 
parliaments can employ what is known as a legal threshold to distribute seats in 
parliament among the competitive parties. If a party receives more than the threshold 
(which is commonly between 3% and 4% of the popular vote) then that party gets 
representation in parliament. District magnitude is the number of seats per electoral 
district. If there are more seats in a district, then parties have a greater opportunity of 
gaining representation. For this chapter, I hypothesize that district magnitude will not 
have a substantial effect on party development in these early elections. Despite the 
numerous authors who have argued that district magnitude is a significant variable 
(Coppedge 1997; Lijphart 1994; Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994 and Taagepera and 
Shugart 1993), I do not expect this variable to be significant. Because there are very few 
institutionalized parties, I posit that district magnitude may be restrictive in certain parts 
of a country (e.g., areas where several political parties compete for power) more than 
others (e.g., areas where very few parties compete for power). The basis of much of this 
chapter is Moser's (1999) work on electoral systems and its effect on party 
institutionalization. Ultimately, I expect other variables in this thesis to be more useful in 
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explaining party institutionalization in East Europe. Therefore, I hypothesize that 
electoral variables will have only a minimal impact on party institutionalization. 
The final substantive chapter focuses on the effect of macroeconomic variables on 
party development. Several authors suggest that economic variables are very influential 
in whether or not voters reward or punish incumbents (Lewis-Beck 1986; Millard 1992; 
Troxel 1993; Pacek 1994; Aguilar and Pacek 2000 and Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000). 
When voters reward incumbents, the number of institutionalized parties should increase. 
Incumbents that have sustained electoral success leads to institutionalized parties. During 
economic decline, voters typically punish incumbents and therefore the number of 
institutionalized parties should decrease. The macroeconomic variables that are the bases 
for this study include: Unemployment rates, gross domestic product (GDP) rates, gross 
national income (GNI) per capita, the debt incurred by the central government, and the 
percentage of the population involved in agriculture. 
I hypothesize that economic variables such as unemployment rates and GNI per 
capita rates will have a significant impact on the number of institutionalized parties. 
More specifically in situations with sustained economic growth, I anticipate an increasing 
or consistent number of parties. Because people tend to reward incumbents for economic 
growth, I expect voters to support incumbents in countries with sustained economic 
growth. On the other hand, I expect to see a decrease in the number of institutionalized 
parties when economic conditions falter because economic decline often results in higher 
voter turnout. Subsequently, this increased turnout often leads to the incumbent being 
removed from office. If voters suspect the economic policies of a party to be the cause of 
economic decline, then voters will probably punish members of that party. When voters 
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punish the members of a particular party, it becomes very hard for that party to maintain 
representation, thereby limiting party development. The number of institutionalized 
parties should decrease because poor economic conditions will prompt voters to punish 
incumbents. In addition, voters will seek a change in a government in the hope of 
improving their economic standing. Thus in countries with struggling economies, it will 
be more difficult for parties to become institutionalized until the economy improves. 
The concluding chapter will explain the significant variables of each chapter. I 
find that macroeconomic variables are the most salient factors in this study. Since voters 
are concerned about their financial standing, variables such as district magnitude or legal 
thresholds offers incumbents little protection from other parties if an economy suffers. I 
believe that behavioral variables (e.g., economic variables) are more influential than 
institutional behaviors (e.g., electoral laws) to voters in East Europe. Therefore, I 
anticipate economic variables to be more significant than all other variables in this study. 
Methodology 
The methodology that I use in this study is ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression. This study employs a cross-national and cross-sectional comparative 
approach. I use this approach because I want to test the relationship between party 
institutionalization and several independent variables. This study will cover three 
different elections in each of the nine countries used in this study. Elections and the 
countries used in this study will be discussed below. 
Institutionalized Parties: How Are They Defined? 
There are several ways to operationalize the dependent variable of 
institutionalized parties. One method would be to determine the number of parties 
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involved in parliamentary elections. A study could count the number of parties that 
participated in an election, or the number of parties that were represented in the 
parliament. Another way is to calculate the number of "effective parties." Some (Rae 
1967) have used this method or variations of this method. One can calculate the effective 
number of parties based on the percentage of the popular vote a party receives, or the 
percentage of seats held by a party. This method is effective because it weighs the parties 
in a parliament so that a party with 90% of the popular vote is not treated the same as a 
party that receives 5% of the popular vote. In other words under the effective number of 
parties approach, the number of parties could be the same but the parties could all be 
different. Because of this reason, I use the method employed by Ordeshook and 
Shvetsova (1994). 
The number of parties within a system can vary tremendously depending on the 
method chosen. While calculating the effective number of parties can be very useful to 
some studies, my goal is to assess which variables either help or hinder party 
development in East Europe. To calculate the number of effective parties does not 
consider the success of parties in competitive elections. It is possible for the effective 
number of parties to maintain a certain level, but this method would not indicate the 
number of institutionalized parties in parliament. 
In their study, they focus on calculating the number of institutionalized parties. 
To measure the number of institutionalized parties, they compute the number of parties 
that held parliamentary representation in consecutive elections. This figure represents the 
number of institutionalized parties in a given system. While this method is quite basic, I 
think it has considerable value for studies in this area. A formula that simply calculates 
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the number of parties in a country would not capture the variables I wish to study. Thus, 
for the purposes of this study, I believe this operationalization is the most logical. As 
previously discussed, the method used by these authors is the most effective and accurate 
way to determine the number of institutionalized parties in this study. 
Another crucial aspect of this study is what parliamentary body to study. There 
are two houses in every country's parliament so the question is whether to examine both 
houses, the upper house or the lower house. Most studies tend to focus on the lower 
house, and since the lower house of parliament traditionally holds most of the law-
making authority, I focus on this house in the following chapters. In addition, the upper 
house tends to have less law-making responsibility than the lower house. Therefore, all 
of the data in this thesis come from electoral results for the lower house of each country's 
parliament. 
Elections Used in this Study 
One of the drawbacks of this study is the limited number of elections that have 
occurred. Most of these countries have been democratic for just over a decade. For a 
majority of countries in this study, the election that I study is only the second, or third, 
democratic election held. Thus, the results of this study should be understood in this 
context. To investigate the development of political parties in East Europe, I use the 
three most current elections in each country. Obviously, it would be impossible to have 
an institutionalized political party in the first democratic election (with the exception of 
former communist parties). Also, variables such as the economy and electoral laws 
might not have an impact on the early elections. In the initial election, voters in many 
post-communist countries have focused on punishing the former communist parties. 
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Because voters focused primarily on ousting the communist regime, economic and 
electoral variables were not influential in this election. Therefore, I used data from the 
three most current elections to study party institutionalization. In most of the countries 
only four elections have occurred, so I am limited in the number of elections I can study. 
Data from elections between 1994 and 1996 are the bases for the first election in 
this study. The second election is based on data from elections that occurred between 
1997 and 1999. The final elections to be studied are the ones that occurred between 2000 
and 2002. Not every country holds their elections simultaneously; therefore, it is 
necessary to have a span of two years so that each country will have had an election 
during this time period. Three separate elections do not constitute a longitudinal study, 
but in almost all of these cases four elections is the most any country has had. In 
addition, much of the research has tested various variables (e.g., district magnitude, 
assembly size, and macroeconomic variables) but since the countries used in this study 
have held only a limited number of democratic elections, the results from this study are 
limited. 
Sample Countries 
Selecting countries is not an easy task. In this study, I include Poland, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. Many of the East 
European countries have been examined in previous studies that are related to party 
development (Kitschelt 1992; Lijphart 1994; Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994; Coppedge 
1997; Moser 1999; Taagepera and Shugart 1993; Aguilar and Pacek 2000; Harper 2000 
and Roper 2003). 
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There are some countries in this region that I could have included but for various 
reasons did not. Slovenia and Bulgaria were initially included but I eliminated them 
because of a lack of data. Generally, countries in the former Soviet Union (FSU) were 
not used in this study because the democratization process and the political development 
of these countries are much different from those in East Europe. King (2000) argues that 
there are fundamental differences between countries in East Europe and the former Soviet 
Union (FSU). The key primary difference between countries in East Europe and 
countries in the FSU is the political development and democratization processes that have 
taken place in both countries. 
Thesis Overview: 
Chapter two examines the relationship between the ethnic heterogeneity of a 
country and the number of institutionalized parties. The ethnic make-up of a country 
refers to the number and size of different ethnic groups within a country. As such, ethnic 
heterogeneity refers to multiple ethnic groups and ethnic homogeneity refers to a country 
with fewer ethnic groups. I expect to see more institutionalized parties in countries that 
are more heterogeneous. With more ethnic groups, parties may be held together by 
ethnicity and be stronger than parties lacking this bond. In more homogeneous countries, 
I expect the number of institutionalized parties to be less because fewer ethnic groups 
should lead to fewer institutionalized parties. Kitschelt (1992) argues that in the absence 
of established parties, citizens will depend on collective identities (e.g .. , ethnicity) to 
influence their political preferences. Therefore, I expect the ethnic make-up of a country 
to play a role in the institutionalization of parties. 
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Chapter three tests the relationship between electoral variables and party 
institutionalization. Many scholars have argued that electoral laws and electoral systems 
influence the number of parties represented in parliament (Taagepera and Shugart 1993; 
Coppedge 1997; Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994 and Cox 1997). In this chapter, I look 
at electoral variables such as: Assembly size, legal thresholds, district magnitude, and 
government type. When studying the effects of electoral systems on party 
institutionalization, my findings diverge from the findings of previous authors. The 
countries that I use in this thesis have had only three or four elections in their short 
democratic history. Therefore, I argue that electoral effects have yet to cause the 
constraining or increasing effects on institutionalized parties. 
The fourth chapter examines the relationship between economic variables and 
party institutionalization. Some political scientists have argued that economics is a 
salient factor to voters in post-communist countries (Pacek 1994; Aguilar and Pacek 
2000). Others, meanwhile, contend that the impact of economics in post-communist 
countries is limited (Hamann 2000; Harper 2000 and Roper 2003). The results from this 
chapter suggest that economics has a stronger impact on party institutionalization in later 
elections more than earlier elections. Still, the results from this chapter suggest that 
economics plays a limited role in party institutionalization. 
The final chapter provides a summary of the key findings reported in the three 
substantive chapters. These results will illustrate which variables are most important for 
each chapter. I hypothesize that ethnic and electoral variables will have less of an impact 
on party institutionalization than economic variables. I believe economic variables will 
be more significant because the impact of electoral effects take time to develop. 
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Additionally, ethnic variables will be less important than economic variables because I 
expect more people to be concerned with economic growth than supporting their ethnic 
group. Further, citizens will have more to gain through supporting incumbents who 
improve the economy rather than a party that is strictly concerned with representing the 
interests of an ethnic group. Parties that are responsible for improving the economy will 
also appeal to more people than parties that benefit only a small sect of the population. 
Overview of Chapter Two: Party Institutionalization and the Ethnicity 
When a country moves from communism to democracy, there are a number of 
issues that the country must address. One of the most daunting tasks is to establish 
democratic institutions. In the absence of established party labels or experienced 
politicians, citizens in East Europe look for other voting cues. It seems logical that 
ethnicity would be a factor in countries that are heterogeneous. For more homogeneous 
countries, I expect that ethnicity would play a smaller role in the development of political 
parties. 
Only a few variables are available to explain a country's heterogeneity. 
Obviously studies can use the number of ethnic groups but this could neglect other 
aspects of ethnicity (such as the distribution of ethnicities within a country). In addition 
to the number of ethnic groups, I also use the presence of an official state language in this 
chapter. I had originally planned to use state religion, but no state in this study had an 
official religion. I also use official state language as a nominal variable to assess the 
relationship between these variables and the number of institutionalized parties. An 
official state language may be present in more homogeneous countries. The use of this 
variable is another way to assess the implications of ethnicity in East European countries. 
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Heterogeneous countries are less likely to have an official language since it would be 
very difficult for one ethnicity to implement an official language over the language of 
another ethnicity. 
Overview of Chapter Three: Party Institutionalization and Electoral Systems 
In chapter three, I test the relationship between the number of institutionalized 
parties and the electoral system. Permissive electoral systems have higher district 
magnitudes, low legal thresholds, large assemblies, and PR systems. My central 
hypothesis is that more permissive electoral systems leads to an increase in the number of 
institutionalized parties. 
There has been considerable research on the number of parties as a result of the 
electoral system. In chapter three, I use district magnitude, legal threshold, government 
type, electoral system, and assembly size to test the significance between these variables 
and the dependent variable. To evaluate the relationship between party 
institutionalization and the independent variables I use OLS regression. The results of 
chapter three indicate a weak relationship between some of the independent variables and 
the dependent variable. I believe that the variables in this study were statistically 
insignificant because it is too early in the democratization process for electoral systems to 
have a substantial impact on party development. In future elections, I expect electoral 
systems to play more of a dominant role in party development. The details of these tests 
are reported and elaborated in chapter three. Ultimately, I find that electoral systems 
have a weak influence on the number of institutionalized parties. 
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Overview of Chapter Four: Party Institutionalization and the Impact of Macroeconomic 
Variables 
The final substantive chapter deals with the relationship between economic 
variables and the effect on party institutionalization. A strong economy can help 
incumbents obtain electoral success while a weak economy can prompt voters to punish 
incumbents. In many elections, voters use retrospective voting to reward (punish) 
incumbents for economic growth (decline). Under retrospective voting, voters focus on 
factors such as the results of an incumbent's representation rather than their policies. The 
variables in this chapter gauge a number of aspects of economic strength. 
Macroeconomic variables are utilized to assess economic strength during the last decade. 
The variables included are: Unemployment rates, GNI per capita, central government 
debt incurred, and GDP growth. 
To test the relationship between the dependent variable and the independent 
variables I use OLS regression. Economic growth often translates into electoral success 
for incumbents while economic decline usually results in incumbent defeat. Most voters 
are more concerned with their pocketbook (or their financial status) as opposed to other 
variables like ethnicity. I expect economic variables to have more of an impact on the 
number of institutionalized parties than variables in the previous two chapters. In future 
elections, I expect economic strength to continue to have a substantial impact on party 
development in East Europe. 
Party institutionalization has received substantially less scholarly attention than 
research on other issues. For example, several scholars have examined the impact of 
voter choice on party success. Some political scientists have focused on the role of 
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ethnicity (Kitschelt 1992; Kolst and Tsilevich and Agh 2000) in post-communist politics 
and others have examined the impact of electoral laws on the number of parties in 
parliament (Taagepera and Shugart 1989; Lijphart 1994 and Moser 1999). Regardless of 
the specific issues, few studies have solely focused on party institutionalization in East 
Europe. The following chapters assess the impact of ethnic, electoral, and economic 
variables on party development in East European countries. 
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Chapter 2 
Party Institutionalization and Ethnicity 
Introduction 
The democratization of states in East Europe and the former Soviet Union (FSU) 
has received substantial attention from scholars (Taagepera 1999; Ordeshook and 
Shvetsova 1994; Kitschelt 1992 and Bielasik 2002). Many of these countries have 
experienced ethnic tension and some severe ethnic violence. This chapter examines the 
relationship between heterogeneity and the development of parties. An institutionalized 
party, for the purposes of this study, refers to political parties that have been represented 
in parliament in consecutive elections. I argue that as the number of ethnic groups 
increases, so will the number of parties in a system. However, the heterogeneity of a 
state will have a minimal impact on the institutionalization of parties because ethnic 
parties that are explicitly concerned with the promotion of a single ethnic identity enjoy 
limited success (Gunther and Diamond 2001). 
One of the distinguishing characteristics of post-communist countries is the 
multiple ethnic groups that reside within each state. The Czech Republic, Bulgaria, and 
Slovakia each have several ethnic groups within their society. With the exception of 
Poland, every country in this survey has at least five major ethnic groups. They range in 
size, backgrounds, and political experience-all of which influences the participation of 
these groups in the political process. In some of these states, there are several ethnic 
groups that are comparable in size while in others there is one dominant group. 
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Literature Review 
Research on parties has been diverse and has focused on several variables such as 
heterogeneity and the number of effective ethnic groups. This chapter investigates the 
causal connection between ethnic groups and how the ethnic composition of a country 
impacts the development and formation of parties. There are. a number of theories that 
attempt to explain how parties coalesce in East Europe and the FSU. I will examine how 
party institutionalization in post-communist states is affected by the degree of 
heterogeneity of a state. 
Ethnicity and Campaigning 
Gunther and Diamond (2001) discuss some general characteristics of ethnic 
political parties. They argue that ethnicity does play a role in party development; 
although, parties primarily based on an ethnicity do not usually enjoy either widespread 
or lasting success. Because parties based on ethnicity are focused on the redistribution of 
assets to their specific group, they do not try and appeal to the entire population, as do 
many broad-based political parties. Ethnic parties can have an almost xenophobic view 
of citizens who are not members of their particular ethnicity. This exclusiveness shared 
by some of these parties often leads to the party's demise. Kitshelt (1992) agrees with 
Gunther and Diamond's arguments about these parties' exclusive approach to 
campaigning, and all of them concur that these parties are primarily concerned with 
obtaining benefits for their particular group. 
Studies such as Kitschelt, and Gunther and Diamond are useful for several 
reasons. By understanding the habits of parties, we will be more apt to develop 
predictive models for party success or failure. Additionally, the cohesion of these ethnic 
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groups will also play a role in party formation. In particular, if an ethnic group is 
politically mobilized, then they will be more likely to sustain their party. On the other 
hand, if a group is more apathetic then party formation will be less dependent upon the 
number of ethnic groups. Barany (2000) discusses this scenario when he studies how the 
Roma have been under-represented in many East European countries. 
Ethnicity as a Political Cleavage 
Ordeshook and Shvetsova (1994) find that party formation depends on social 
cleavages including ethnicity. They postulate that in heterogeneous societies parties will 
grow in numbers and in stability. Ordeshook and Shvetsova go on to say that when 
ethnic fractionalization decreases and district magnitude increases, there will be an 
increase in the number of effective parties. The findings of this study were interesting, 
but were limited because it lacked an ethnic concentration index and the statistical 
significance was relatively low (.111). An ethnic concentration index could better 
explain party stability because more densely distributed ethnicities should lead to more 
institutionalized parties whereas a sparsely distributed ethnicity should be more difficult 
to mobilize. In addition, if an ethnic group is equally distributed throughout a country, 
the ethnicity may not be able to gain representation for the group. On the other hand, if 
an ethnic group comprises a large percentage of an electoral district, then the ethnic 
group may be able to elect a candidate who will carefully protect the interests of that 
ethnicity. 
Kitschelt's (1992) work focuses on the study of ethnicity. He argues that political 
divisions depend on several factors: Ethnicity, race, and regional collective identities. 
After the inception of democracy in East Europe, Kitschelt finds that in the absence of 
18 
established parties, citizens looked to factors like collective identities, or ethnicity as a 
guide for voting. He also finds that ethnicity is more influential in some countries-
Romania and Slovakia-than others. In the case of Romania, Kitschelt argues that the 
number of ethnic divisions in this country will lead to weakened ethnic parties, and a rise 
in power for ex-communist parties. 
Taagepera (1999) argues that there is a relationship between electoral system 
rules, ethnicity, and the number of parties. More specifically, Taagepera finds an 
increase in the number of parties when electoral rules do not severely restrict party 
representation (i.e., lower legal thresholds or few electoral restrictions) and when a 
society has a number of ethnic cleavages. His research, however, does not exclusively 
focus on institutionalized parties. 
Tabula Rasa and the Structure Perspective 
There are several perspectives on party development. Bielasik (2001) argues that 
party development in East Europe and the FSU exists in two forms: tabula rasa, and the 
structure perspective. Tabula rasa emphasizes the newness of political parties, and posits 
that party development in these countries is in a constant state of flux. Many of these 
parties are weak and as a result these parties cannot maintain representation. Therefore, I 
believe that ethnicity could be an issue that causes parties to splinter or it could promote 
party cohesion. 
The structure perspective describes linkages between parties and various issues. 
This perspective can be illustrated through issues that are specific to particular ethnic 
groups. According to this theory, parties represent various issues and whenever these 
issues reach the political agenda, representation will be witnessed through certain parties. 
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For example, if an issue has a direct effect on ethnic groups (i.e., political rights for an 
ethnic group, the recognition of languages other than the state's official language, social 
welfare programs, etc.) an ethnically-based party should represent the needs of ethnic 
groups. This theory can be applied in this study because certain parties represent 
particular ethnic groups. According to this theory, if these groups were to be threatened 
by some type of legislation or governmental action there would be factions in place to 
protect any group that faces potential harm. 
Orenstein (1998) goes on to describe different types of parties. The first type, 
ideological/purposive, are dependent upon a charismatic individual and/or function as 
"political clubs," and attempt to broadly attract a number of voters. Ethnically based 
parties, in order to be successful, need to adopt broad strategies. Unfortunately, these 
parties are typified by exclusive policy stances. The second type, social-democratic 
communist successor include members/voters that span socio-economic cleavages such 
as trade unions, farmers, and new business elites. lshiyama (1997) also finds that ex-
communist parties that employ broad or nation-wide strategies will be more successful in 
the future than parties that are more specific. 
Ishiyama (1997) and Orenstein (1998) find that parties seek electoral support 
through appealing to a national audience. This strategy seems effective in a homogenous 
society, but is more difficult to utilize if the national audience consists of several ethnic 
groups, such as in the case of Latvia. According to Kolst and Tsilevich (1997), the 
parties in Latvia attempted to mobilize electoral support by manipulating nationalistic 
sentiment. As described by Kolst and Tsilevich, ethnic differences and under-
representation can limit democracy's progress; thus, the need to broaden our 
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understanding of these problems is crucial. Parties that represent a particular ethnic 
group are common throughout East Europe. If each ethnic group had its own party, then 
decision-making would require additional time, and coalition formation could become 
further complicated. 
One of the key determinants to a party's success is their ability to develop 
linkages to voters. Kitschelt and Smyth (2002) argue that linkages are crucial to a party's 
future. Specific to this study, Kitschelt (1992) has argued that parties face demise when 
they fail to reach the public at large. While Kitschelt argues that voter linkages are 
crucial to a party's future, these parties must reach out to the broader public. This 
explains why broad-based strategies are preferred, and this also explains why ethnically 
based parties enjoy limited success. 
Hyper-Pluralism and its Effect on Party Development 
While the effects of party success or failure and its impact on party cohesion have 
been discussed, the representation of parties has implications on the stability of 
parliament. Many authors (Simon 1996 and Olson and Norton 1996) argue that hyper-
pluralism causes parliaments to be in disarray, and impedes the progress of parliamentary 
committees. Hyper-pluralism refers to the over-representation of parties, or when too 
many groups are represented and the groups possess sufficient power to retard 
governmental action (Edwards, Wattenberg, and Lineberry 2002). Hyper-pluralism can 
occur if each ethnic group mobilizes its respective populations and forms a party to 
further its interests. In some cases, hyper-pluralism has prevented governments from 
functioning. 
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The case of Poland, in the early democratization process, provides an excellent 
example. Simon (1996) uses three Polish elections to compare party fragmentation and 
representation, and finds that between 1991-1993, twenty-nine political parties were 
represented in the Sejm. Therefore, in the case of the 1991 Sejm, nine months passed 
before a governing coalition was formed. While this was not due to ethnicity, it certainly 
demonstrates the consequences of hyper-pluralism. Obviously, representation is 
important, but over-representation can lead to a parliamentary stalemate. If every distinct 
group organizes a party, then gridlock will result when so many voices compete for 
maximum gains through governmental action-namely re-distributive programs and 
more favorable electoral laws. 
Methodology 
This chapter examines the institutionalization of parties in East European 
countries. These countries will be tested with variables that are related to ethnicity and 
the ethnic make-up of these states. Variables related to ethnicity are used in this chapter 
to analyze the relationship between ethnicity and the number of institutionalized parties. 
The dependent variable in this chapter is the number of institutionalized parties. 
The initial election in these countries witnessed numerous parties participating in 
parliamentary elections. However, the number of parties in parliamentary elections 
decreased and stabilized in subsequent elections. Several authors have studied how the 
number of parties are affected by ethnic, electoral, or economic variables, (Duverger 
1954; Cox 1997; Coppedge 1997; Gunther and Diamond 2001; Moser 1999 and Kitschelt 
1992) but this study is interested in the institutionalization of political parties. Ordeshook 
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and Shvetsova's (1994) method was used because it seems logical, and because itmost 
accurately measures party institutionalization. 
Also, this study is designed to be not only comparative, but also longitudinal. By 
using a longitudinal approach, any temporal events will be eliminated as potential 
influential variables. To understand the development of parties, I have used the three 
most current elections. Since this study is focused on party formation, the data used in 
this chapter will be drawn from three different time periods: the second election after the 
inception of democracy (1994-1996), a mid-decade election (1997-1999), and a final 
election between 2000 and 2002. Through studying these three elections, I am able to 
rule out candidate-centered parties and parties that experienced success in only one 
election. In most of these cases, only a few of the parties were successful in the second 
elections. 
My model will employ a number of independent variables. State languages and 
the number of ethnic groups in each country are the two primary variables used in this 
chapter. If a state has a constitutionally recognized state language, the variable is coded 
"1" and "O" when there is no official language. The presence of a state religion was 
originally included, but every country in this study was without an official religion, and 
thus, I omitted this variable. 
The number of parties in consecutive elections is based on data from various web 
sites. This variable, in addition to the other variables previously mentioned, will be 
compared with the number of parties in a state. Census data not only provided the 
number of ethnic groups, but in most cases, it also offered the percentage of the 
population that belonged to the various ethnic groups. A number of approaches have 
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been used in previous research to compute the number of parties in parliament (Rae 1967 
and Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994). The primary focus in this research is to examine 
the impact state languages and ethnicity play in party development. To compute the 
number of institutionalized parties in parliament, I use a method similar to Ordeshook 
and Shvetsova's (1994). I consider institutionalized parties to be any party that has 
parliamentary representation in consecutive elections (no matter the percentage of seats). 
The first variable in this test was language. An official state language can be an 
indication of the ethnic make-up of a country. For example a country with few ethnic 
groups or one dominant ethnic group, may be more inclined to implement an official 
national language. More heterogeneous countries, on the other hand, should be less 
likely to declare an official language. More ethnic groups should lead to more 
disagreement on an official language or the ethnicities may believe that no language 
should be the official language of the country. I anticipate that the presence of an official 
language will have a negative influence on the number of institutionalized parties. 
Because I believe that an official state language is an indicator of an ethnically 
homogenous society, I expect that countries should have more institutionalized parties 
when there is no official language. 
The number of ethnic groups will be used as an interval variable to establish a 
basis for this study. The primary focus of this chapter is to examine the relationship 
between the number institutionalized parties and ethnicity (I expect to find more 
institutionalized parties in heterogeneous societies, and fewer institutionalized parties in 
more homogeneous societies). More ethnic groups are a reflection of social cleavages, 
and most of these heterogeneous states have parties that are relatively unstable. 
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Findings 
I employ ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to examine the relationship 
between ethnicity and party institutionalization. The results of the test between state 
language and the number of institutionalized parties are also reported in the following 
tables. Also, in table 2.1 the dependent variable, the number of institutionalized parties 
that gained representation in this election, is compared with the number of ethnic groups 
within a state. In the final two tests I use data from recent elections to examine the 
relationship between ethnicity and the number of institutionalized parties. Results from 
this table report my findings for the first test. 
Party Institutionalization Between 1994-1996 
T bl 21 I ft f r dP f a e . ns 1 u 10na 1ze ar 1es an . . d Eth . "t b t IllCilY e ween 1994 1996 
-
Independent Significance Standardized Beta Values 
Variables 
Language .029* -1.145 
Ethnic Groups .123 -.616 
AdjustedRL .734 --
n=9 -- --
*p<.05 
The first variable in this study was the presence of an official state language. This 
variable reported whether or not each state had a state language. For the first test, the 
presence of a state language was significant to the 95% level. The standardized beta 
coefficient for this variable was -1.145 and this value represents a negative relationship 
between this variable and the number of institutionalized parties. I expected this variable 
to be significant in early elections, and I predicted that the relationship would be 
negative. The results here demonstrate that countries without an official state language 
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have more institutionalized parties whereas the number of institutionalized parties is 
fewer in countries with an official language. 
The second variable used in this study is the number of ethnic groups within a 
country. The findings in this test reveal a standardized beta coefficient of .123 which 
illustrates a positive relationship. I had anticipated countries with more ethnic groups to 
have more institutionalized parties while countries with fewer ethnic groups would have 
less institutionalized parties. If significant, the results would suggest that as the number 
of ethnic groups increase so do the number of developed parties. Since this variable was 
insignificant, however, the impact the number of ethnic groups has on party 
institutionalization is unclear. 
The findings from the overall model suggest that there is a strong correlation 
between the independent and dependent variables. The adjusted R2 of this model was 
.734 which illustrates a strong positive relationship. However, with only two variables in 
this model I suspect problems with these variables. This value is relatively high since 
only two variables are used in this test, and especially since only one variable was 
statistically significant. In the next test, I expect a different result for the presence of an 
official language, but I anticipate the impact of ethnic groups to remain about the same. 
In addition, I anticipate the adjusted R2 to be much lower than it was in this test. 
Party Institutionalization Between 1997-1999 
The information from the first election is important, but is limited in the fact that 
it represents the first elections in the sample. Therefore, another study was done to 
determine if the variables were time-sensitive, or if these relationships are static 
throughout the 1990s. Table 2.2 reports findings for elections between 1997-1999. By 
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using this data, we will get a better understanding of the effects that have occurred since 
the first democratic elections in these states. 
T bl 2 2 I ft f I' d P f a e . ns 1u10na 1ze ar 1es an . . d Eth . "t b t lllCity e ween 1997 1999 . 
Independent Significance Standardized Beta Values 
Variables 
Language .257 -.477 
Ethnic Groups .574 .226 
Adjusted Rt .198 --
n=9 -- --
The first independent variable in this study was language. The results from the 
first test report a standardized beta coefficient of -1.145. The findings here again suggest 
that countries without an official state language should have more institutionalized 
parties. Because this relationship was statistically insignificant, I am unable to say with 
certainty that official state languages increase the number of developed parties in a 
system. I had hypothesized that an official state language should lead to more 
institutionalized parties, and I am not surprised that the beta coefficient was negative. In 
early elections I expect variables like language and ethnicity to play a greater role than in 
later elections. This negative standardized beta coefficient suggests that the number of 
institutionalized parties is greater in countries with no official language. I believe that the 
salience of an official language declines in subsequent elections and this is why the 
variable is insignificant in this test. Another plausible explanation is that the presence of 
state languages has a limited effect on party institutionalization. 
The influence ethnic groups have on party development for the first test was quite 
minimal. Findings from this second test were similar to the previous test. The number of 
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ethnic groups had a standardized beta coefficient of .174 in the second test. The 
coefficient slightly increased from the first test, but the relationship was positive in both 
tests. The findings here suggest that a positive relationship exists between the number of 
ethnic groups and the number of developed parties. Much like the first test the results 
here were insignificant and cannot support any definitive conclusions from these data. 
The adjusted R2 of this test was much lower than the first test. For this test the 
adjusted R2 was just .193 while the previous test had an adjusted R2 of . 734. I believe 
that without any significant relationships in this second test, the results suggest that the 
influence of ethnicity on party development wanes over time. Furthermore, I suspect that 
problems in the results from the first test caused the high adjusted R2, but the results from 
the second test are more representative of the true relationship between the number of 
institutionalized parties and ethnicity. 
Party Institutionalization Between 2000-2002 
The third model tested data from elections since the year 2000. I hypothesize that 
the results should be similar to the results of the previous tests. As previously discussed, 
I expect that ethnicity should have less of an impact on party institutionalization than in 
previous elections. I expect that political learning should increase and voters will be 
more concerned with factors other than ethnicity. 
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T bl 2 3 I ft f r d P f d Eth . "t b t 2000 2002 a e . ns 1u10na 1ze ar 1es an IllCI ty e ween 
-
. . 
Independent Significance Standardized Beta 
Variables Values 
Language .704 -.240 
Ethnic· Groups .808 .098 
AdjustedR.1. -.233 
--
n=9 -- --
The results of the first two tests for the presence of an official state language were 
mixed. Both tests reported a negative relationship but only the first test was statistically 
significant. In the third test the standardized beta coefficient was -.240. This variable 
was again insignificant, so the impact of this variable on the dependent variable was 
limited. If this relationship was significant, the results indicate that countries with an 
official language should have fewer institutionalized parties. 
The relationship between the number of ethnic groups and the number of 
institutionalized parties was again statistically insignificant. For this test the standardized 
beta coefficient was .098 which reveals a positive relationship for these two variables. 
The coefficient value suggests that the number of ethnic groups results in an increase in 
the number of institutionalized parties. Without statistical significance, however, my 
results do not provide any solid conclusions as to the role ethnicity plays in the 
institutionalization of parties in East Europe. 
The model's adjusted R2 has decreased since the first test. In the first election, the 
overall R2 was .734 and this decreased to .193 in the second study, and continued to 
decrease in the final test to -.166. From these findings one thing is clear: Ethnicity plays 
a decreasing role in party institutionalization as the number of democratic elections 
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mcreases. My explanation for this trend is that voters focus on ethnicity in early elections 
but with political learning they focus on more important issues. Thus, the role of 
ethnicity will continue to decrease in future elections for East European countries. 
Conclusion 
Party institutionalization is an important variable in political science research and 
much of the current research has looked at areas such as: The economy, electoral 
systems, and ideology. This chapter has sought to contribute to the contemporary 
research by looking specifically at ethnic variables in comparative analysis of states in 
East Europe throughout the 1990s. During the 1990s, East Europe has been very unstable 
and the lack of established parties may be a reason why. Because of this, the impact of 
party institutionalization can help us develop a clearer picture of democratic 
development. If democracy becomes more stable, then perhaps other areas of life can 
also grow in stability. 
The variables included in this chapter were by no means exhaustive. The 
variables included were simply indicators that showed some diversity among other 
variables for Eastern European states. Ethnic groups are one of the best indicators of a 
state's diversity. For future research, perhaps a concentration index could be developed 
to show how dispersed or clustered these different groups are. If an ethnic group is 
distributed throughout the state, then it seems likely that they would receive less 
representation than if they were more concentrated. 
The literature mentioned earlier in this study provides a starting point for research 
in this area. Because of the changes in the independent variables, it seems as though the 
parties involved in this study are not firmly established, and are still experiencing signs of 
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change. Therefore, the research done by Bielasik (2001) and Kitschelt (1992) seem to be 
most appropriate to describe the evolving nature of this system. Bielasik presented two 
arguments: tabula rasa and the structure perspectives. The tabula rasa argument posits 
that new democracies have parties that are nascent and are increasing. The results from 
this chapter suggest that the number of institutionalized parties is changing as well as the 
parties in parliament. While more research is necessary to fully support this perspective, 
the nature of these political systems seem to fit best with the principles of tabula rasa. 
Kitschelt argues that ethnicity plays a substantial role in early elections because voters 
have few other indicators to influence their voting. This chapter has contributed to 
political science research by arguing that ethnicity plays a very limited role in party 
institutionalization in East Europe. As democracy continues, voters develop tendencies 
or expectations of certain aspects of the government. I believe one of these aspects is the 
economy, and this variable will be examined in chapter four. 
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Chapter3 
Party Institutionalization and Electoral Systems 
Introduction 
Party institutionalization can be influenced by a number of variables, many of 
which were discussed in the previous chapter. Ballot structure, seat allocation procedures 
or formulas, and general electoral rules impact the number and types of parties within a 
state. This chapter will examine party institutionalization with respect to electoral 
systems. An electoral system is the method by which votes are translated into seats and 
includes issues such as ballot structure, electoral formulas and district magnitude. This 
chapter examines the relationship between institutionalized parties and electoral 
variables. 
Party development in East Europe has received a great deal of attention. One of 
the reasons for this is the democratization and consolidation process in these countries is 
influenced by the development of fully functioning parties. This chapter examines which 
electoral system is most conducive to party institutionalization. Do legal thresholds limit 
the number of functioning parties within a state? What are the consequences for seat 
allocation procedures? Do mixed systems, such as those in Lithuania and Hungary, limit 
parties like single member districts do? These questions and the effect of other variables 
such as assembly size and district magnitude will be examined in the following sections. 
The first section of this chapter offers a summary of existing research. Several 
political scientists have examined the impact electoral systems have on the number of 
parties (Duverger 1954; Taagepera and Shugart 1993; Lijphart 1994; Coppedge 1997 and 
Cox 1997) but research on electoral systems and party institutionalization is much more 
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limited. Some argue that assembly size or district magnitude can increase the number of 
parties represented in a system (Taagepera and Shugart 1993) while other scholars have 
claimed that mixed electoral systems restrict the number of parties in a system (Coppedge 
1997). This chapter tests several variables with the dependent variable, the number of 
institutionalized parties. The third, and final, section will compare the literature with the 
results of this chapter to either support or reject the findings presented in the second 
section. 
Literature Review 
Electoral systems and their impact on the number of parties has received 
substantial attention from political scientists. The impact of different seat allocation 
formulas can have a strong effect on the number of parties within a system. Proportional 
representation (PR) systems tend to be more permissive and allow for more parties than 
other systems (Duverger 1957 and Cox 1997). In a PR system, several states have 
established a minimum percentage of popular votes necessary to gain seats in the 
legislature. This minimum percentage is known as a legal threshold. Legal thresholds 
can also play a role in party institutionalization. Specifically, several scholars have 
argued that legal thresholds have a definite impact on the number of parties in parliament 
(Taagepera and Shugart 1989 and Cox 1997). Scholars have argued that lower thresholds 
will offer more opportunities for parties to gain representation thereby increasing the 
number of parties involved in the process (Coppedge 1997; Cox 1997 and Taagepera and 
Shugart 1993). 
The effect of electoral systems on the number of parties in parliament has 
received considerable attention from political scientists. Research on this area has 
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covered a number of variables related to electoral systems: Assembly size, district and/or 
average district magnitude, legal thresholds and ballot structure. Ballot structure refers to 
the whether or not there is one round of elections or multiple rounds. In some states, 
multiple rounds allow voters to strategically vote to help their candidate and hurt the 
opponent. For some of these systems, a plurality is the minimum requirement where 
others require a majority vote to win. 
Electoral Systems 
Duverger (1957) in his seminal work Political Parties: Their Organization and 
Activity in the Modern State. makes a number of compelling arguments regarding 
electoral systems and how they affect the number of parties in parliament. He argues that 
there are three types of party systems. The first type of party system, the single party 
system, exists primarily in dictatorial regimes and is not of interest to this study. Second, 
Duverger writes on two party systems and how they evolve. The final type of party 
system, multi-party systems, is another category of contemporary democracies. 
Political parties do not simply appear upon the inception of democracy; rather, the 
steps taken by a state dictates the number of parties that will be effective in an electoral 
system. For states with a simple plurality and single ballot system, the likely result will 
be two powerful parties. This occurs because voters tend to vote out the least established 
party, which is often the newest party. Thus, even though several parties may compete in 
the initial or early elections, the success of most parties will be short-lived. 
A multi-party system will emerge under different circumstances. Rather than 
single member districts, multi-member PR systems produce multi-party systems. When 
France went from a single member district system, with two dominant parties, to a 
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proportional representation system it witnessed the multiplicative effect of this new 
electoral system (1957). This effect is not always instantaneous, but according to 
Duverger it will eventually occur. While PR leads to an increase in the number of 
parties, the switch from a single ballot system to a multiple ballot system adds to this 
effect. Of particular interest to this study, he argues that the increase in parties will most 
likely result from new parties instead of divisions in the existing parties. 
In his study of Russian party development, McFaul (2001) finds that the state's 
lower house of parliament, the Duma, is limited in its power. The Duma has one-half of 
its membership elected through PR lists and the other half elected from single member 
districts. The electoral reforms taken by those in the Duma have managed to restrict the 
influence of political parties. Essentially, the author finds that in the case of strong 
executives and weak parliaments, the institutionalization of political parties will be 
hindered. 
Mechanical Effects 
Several authors have discussed mechanical effects of electoral systems such as 
assembly size, district magnitude and seat allocation procedures (Cox 1997; Duverger 
1957; Taagepera and Shugart 1993 and Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1996). Assembly size 
is one of the most basic components of any electoral system. The size of a country's 
parliament can provide either greater or lesser representation, depending on the ratio 
between the state's population and the size of the assembly. A seat allocation procedure 
refers to the distribution of seats through elections. The countries in this chapter use 
either mixed electoral systems, with a combination of PR and single member districts or 
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PR systems. The variables, depending on the allocation procedure, may be interlinked 
but in theory they may be studied independently. 
District magnitude is used in several studies, and is defined as the average number 
of seats per electoral district. Taagepera and Shugart (1993) argue that politicians who 
want to increase the representative nature of an electoral system can either increase the 
district magnitude of a country or increase the assembly size. District magnitude, 
according to Coppedge (1997), is a significant indicator of party fractionalization. 
Similar to the constraining effects of Du verger's law regarding PR systems, he argues 
that lower district magnitudes will lead to fewer parties. The logic behind this is that 
lower district magnitudes present fewer opportunities for parties to gain representation 
while higher district magnitude provides more opportunities for representation. The 
psychological and mechanical effects of district magnitude both play a role in this study. 
Psychological effects refer to the impact electoral systems have on voters, while 
mechanical effects are related to the translation of votes into seats (1997). Coppedge also 
finds no statistical significance for legal thresholds, which will be discussed later. 
Many political scientists, including Coppedge and Lijphart (1994), have argued 
that district magnitude has a significant impact on party institutionalization. However, 
other variables such as electoral formulas have also influence party institutionalization. 
According to Coppedge and Lijphart, electoral formulas exist in three primary forms: 
PR, semi-proportional systems, and majoritarian systems. Not only does Lijphart's study 
examine district magnitude, it also examines assembly size. Much like other authors, I 
contend that as the average district magnitude increases so will the number of parties in 
the parliament. 
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Taagepera and Shugart (1989) posit that legal thresholds have a limiting effect on 
party institutionalization. By imposing restrictions on party representation, it is easy to 
see why thresholds restrain the number of parties represented in a parliament. States with 
explicit legal thresholds are common in East Europe. When there is no set threshold, 
Taagepera and Shugart state that there are other mechanisms in place which limit the 
number of parties. The authors go on to say that low district magnitude is the equivalent 
of high thresholds because lower district magnitudes will constrict the number of seats 
available. Lower legal thresholds are more permissive because this lowers the minimum 
requirement to gain representation: It is much easier to get 1 % or 2% of the popular vote 
rather than 4% or 5%-which is common in the states in this chapter. The findings by 
Ordeshook and Shvetsova (1994) are very similar to those reported earlier. Ordeshook 
and Shvetsova also find that permissive electoral systems (i.e., systems that have lower 
legal thresholds and higher district magnitudes) tend to witness more parties than 
restrictive electoral systems. 
Taagepera and Shugart (1993) test a variation of district magnitude called 
effective district magnitude. These scholars calculate effective district magnitude in the 
same manner which scholars determine effective number of political parties. Effective 
district magnitude is a modification of both district and average district magnitude which 
takes into account extreme cases of district magnitude. This variable is used to obtain a 
more thorough understanding of district magnitudes. 
Electoral Systems 
In his book, Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral 
Systems, Cox (1997) considers the additive effects of electoral systems and social 
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diversity. He finds that the number of parties depends on the "permissiveness" of a 
state's electoral system. My study is interested in the factors that influence party 
institutionalization, and Cox's work gives a number of variables that affect the number of 
parties in parliament. According to Cox, a "permissive" electoral system exists in PR 
systems, while single member districts have the similar constraining effect described by 
Duverger and others. PR systems are more "permissive" because they typically provide 
more opportunities for weaker parties to gain representation through lower legal 
thresholds, higher district magnitudes, and the system itself. The system allows for more 
representation because it is easier to gain representation in a PR system rather than a 
single member district system. A PR system usually presents a better chance for new or 
weaker parties to gain a percentage of votes instead of the latter system in which a party 
must gain either a plurality or a majority. 
Methodology 
To study party institutionalization, I operationalize the dependent variable as any 
party that has gained representation in consecutive elections. Many political scientists 
have used the "effective" number of political parties but this approach severely limits the 
number of parties in these systems. Also, by using this method the purpose of this 
chapter would be missed. If this study was specifically testing the number of parties in a 
system then perhaps this method could be a better indicator of statistical significance. 
This study, however, is concerned with the number of institutionalized parties in a system 
and to determine this, I believe it is necessary to include any party that has gained 
representation in more than one of the elections in this study. Ordeshook and Shvetsova 
(1994) used an approach similar to this when they counted any party that had participated 
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in consecutive elections and received at least 1 % of the popular vote. This does 
effectively count the number of institutionalized parties, but overlooks the internal 
changes (i.e., gaining or losing charismatic leaders) that occur in these parties. 
As mentioned before, I will use the number of parties that have held 
representation in more than one of the elections in this study. The institutionalization of 
parties is largely based on the presence of these factions in consecutive elections, but the 
party label is also an important characteristic of institutionalized parties. Thus, this 
chapter will gauge how many parties have participated in elections and consecutive 
elections by examining the repetition of party labels in these elections. Further, 
institutionalized parties are any party that has gained representation in consecutive 
elections, and one of the easiest ways to identify institutionalized parties is through party 
labels. 
The first independent variable to be studied is the assembly size of each country's 
lower house. More populous states should have larger parliaments than less populous 
states. The contention is that larger populations will lead to larger assemblies. For this 
study, the importance of this variable will be the effect assembly size has on the number 
of institutionalized parties. I argue that states with larger assemblies will have more 
parties that are institutionalized. 
The next variable to be studied is the legal threshold. Legal thresholds play an 
important role in the translation of votes into seats. Most states use a 4% or 5% legal 
threshold which means that a party must reach this threshold before seats are allocated. 
Many scholars, (Taagepera and Shugart 1989 and Cox 1997), argue that higher legal 
thresholds will constrict the number of effective parties. In many instances, the ruling 
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party will institute a legal threshold or increase the existing thresholds to maintain their 
representation in the assembly. Similar to others, I argue that a higher threshold will 
result in fewer institutionalized political parties. 
As many of the authors have suggested, party institutionalization is closely 
associated with district magnitude. District magnitude is calculated by dividing the total 
number of electoral districts by the number of seats in the lower house of each state's 
legislature. This variable is calculated for each election so that any changes in the 
number of seats or districts are accounted for in every election. As several others have 
suggested (Coppedge 1997; Lijphart 1994; and Taagepera and Shugart 1993) the number 
of parties will increase if the district magnitude increases. I also expect to find that 
district magnitude will have a positive significant relationship with the dependent 
variable. I believe this relationship will be consistent with earlier research, and the 
relationship will be positive because higher district magnitudes equal more opportunities 
for parties to enter the legislature. 
Findings 
I use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression for each of the last three elections 
for each of the states included in this study. The number of institutionalized parties in 
each election is compared to the five independent variables. 
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Party Institutionalization Between 1994-1996 
T bl 31 I ft f I' dP f a e . ns 1 u 10na 1ze ar 1es an . . d El t l S t ec ora 1ys ems b t e ween 1994 1996 
-
Independent Significance Standardized Beta 
Variables Coefficients 
District Magnitude .180 1.152 
Total Seats (Assembly Size) .372 -.569 
Legal Threshold .370 -.635 
AdjustedRL .703 
--
n=9 -- --
District magnitude is the first variable included in table 3.1. Many scholars have 
found that this variable is a determining factor in party development. In this study, 
district magnitude was an average of districts. The standardized beta coefficient for 
district magnitude in this study was 1.152 which illustrates a positive relationship with 
party institutionalization. The value, however, represents a limited contribution to the 
model. If this beta value was statistically significant, the results would imply that the 
number of institutionalized parties increases as district magnitude increases. 
Even though the final two variables are interrelated, each variable has been 
included to represent different aspects of electoral systems. The first variable, total seats 
(assembly size), has been included for one reason: More seats present more opportunities 
for parties to enter the legislature and more opportunities for parties to become 
established. The assembly size is based on the total number of seats in the first election, 
and in this study the variable had a beta score of -.569. Much like the legal threshold 
value, this value is negative but has a relatively high score. I am surprised that the 
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relationship here is negative primarily because more seats provide more opportunities for 
parties to become institutionalized. 
Some scholars have argued that legal thresholds are a dominant factor in party 
development while others have found that this variable does not influence party 
development. In the first election to be studied, legal thresholds received a low, negative 
beta score of -.635. Thus, without statistical significance, the inclusion of this variable 
has little significance to the outcome of this regression. For the elections in this study 
legal thresholds have little impact on party institutionalization. 
The adjusted R2 of this model indicates the significance level between the 
dependent variable and the independent variables. In this case, the significance value 
was .703 which high despite the absence of significant variables. Since the adjusted R2 
for the model was so high it seems that multicollinearity may be present. Therefore, the 
combination of these variables has caused the adjusted R2 to be very high even though the 
model contains no statistically significant variables. 
Next, we will investigate whether or not these values were similar or if dramatic 
changes have occurred in the next election to alter the results of the overall significance. 
The results of this test may change in the next election for several reasons. The parties in 
power may increase the legal threshold or decrease the number of seats in parliament to 
limit the number of parties in parliament. Several parties may have gained 
representation, and wish to keep this representation and will therefore lower the 
threshold, increase the district magnitude, or increase the assembly size to provide 
additional opportunities for parties in the electorate. 
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Party Institutionalization Between 1997-1999 
For the second test, the variables will assess party development in the following 
election. This is election did not occur in the same year for all states, but this time frame 
is approximately 1997-1999. Hopefully, the variables in this section will give us some 
insight as to the trends in party institutionalization. Have any electoral changes affected 
party institutionalization? Is it too early to tell of any significant changes? The changes 
in basic electoral structure-assembly size, legal thresholds, or district magnitude-have 
been modest. 
T bl 3 2 I ft f r d P f a e . ns 1 u 10na 1ze ar 1es an . . d El t 1 S t ec ora iys ems b t e ween 1997 1999 
-
Independent Significance Standardized Beta 
Variables Coefficients 
District Magnitude .419 -.416 
Total Seats (Assembly Size) .611 .327 
Legal Threshold .554 .408 
Adjusted R"" -.305 --
n=9 -- --
While the results of the first test fell short of this study' s hypotheses, the results of 
the second test are more promising. The same variables were used in both tests, but some 
variables had different values because of electoral changes or because of party 
institutionalization. The variables in this study were short of statistical significance. 
Overall, however, the values improved a great deal from the previous test. 
The first variable, district magnitude, was not significant in either of the first tests. 
The standardized beta value for district magnitude was -.416 which shows a moderate 
contribution to the overall significance of the model's significance. Further, this negative 
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coefficient indicates that the number of institutionalized parties increases when district 
magnitude is lower, and the number of institutionalized parties decreases when this 
variable is higher. Without statistical significance, however, my results are limited. 
Some countries actually increased the number of seats in the legislature since the first 
election in this study. Most surprising is the fact that the beta coefficient from the first 
test was positive and in this test it is negative. The effect of district magnitude may have 
changed in this test because of changes in the representation structure (i.e., an increase 
seats) but is difficult to tell from this study. 
The assembly size was the second variable in this test. I expected this variable to 
have a positive impact on party institutionalization since more seats present more 
opportunities for parties to participate in the electoral system. The standardized beta 
coefficient for assembly size was .327 and this shows that this variable had a moderate 
contribution to the model's significance. In this test the relationship between this 
variable and the number of institutionalized parties was positive. I am surprised that 
assembly size reports a negative beta value in the first test but not in the second. I 
believe that more seats present more opportunities for parties to gain representation, and 
this effect is present in this test. Without statistical significance, I am unable to draw any 
solid conclusions about this relationship. 
Legal threshold is the final variable in this analysis. Many have argued that 
higher legal thresholds have a constricting effect on party institutionalization since the 
permissiveness of the electoral system is reduced. However, from these results it is 
apparent that the level of legal threshold has little bearing on party institutionalization in 
these cases. Legal threshold had a minimal contribution to the overall statistical 
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significance, with a beta score of .408. This score is again positive and this suggests that 
higher legal thresholds result in more institutionalized parties. Many authors have argued 
that lower legal thresholds increase the opportunities for parties to enter parliament, but 
my findings present the opposite view. From the findings here, I surmise that without 
statistical significance, the impact of legal thresholds on party institutionalization is 
limited. 
Finally, the overall model R2 increased substantially from the previous study's 
significance level of .703. The adjusted R2 for this study is -.305, which indicates a low 
level of significance. This model lacks any variables that are statistically significant and 
this explains the model's R2 value. I attribute the high model R2 in the first test to 
multicollinearity among the independent variables, which would result in higher R2 
despite the lack of significant variables. I believe the low adjusted R2 for the second test 
indicates that electoral systems play only a limited role in party institutionalization. 
Party Institutionalization Between 2000-2002 
In this final section, the variables will be examined once more but with data from 
the most current election. The time frame for this final test is between 2000 and 2002. 
Party institutionalization is not something that can be tested in a single election, and one 
way to improve this study is to add more cases (e.g. elections or countries). Regardless, 
for this study the levels of significance increased from the first to second tests, and have 
continued to increase in this test. To reduce the effects of multicollinearity I use stepwise 
regression in this final test. 
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T bl 3 3 I ft f r dP f a e . ns 1 u 10na 1ze ar 1es an . . d El t l S t ec ora ivs ems b t e ween 2000 2002 
-
Independent Significance Standardized Beta 
Variables Coefficients 
District Magnitude .374 -.439 
Total Seats (Assembly Size) .552 -.378 
Legal Threshold .762 -.198 
Adjusted R'1. -.251 --
n=9 -- --
District magnitude was again statistically in significant in this test. The 
standardized beta coefficient for this variable was -.439 thereby illustrating a modest 
contribution to the overall significance. Further, the beta coefficient was negative in this 
study which suggests that as district magnitude increases the number of institutionalized 
parties decreases. As other authors have suggested, higher district magnitude leads to 
more parties. The findings here do not support this assertion. In future research, I would 
anticipate district magnitude to be a factor in the institutionalization of political parties in 
East Europe. 
Assembly size is the second variable used in this test. As mentioned earlier, I 
expected larger assemblies to have a larger number of established parties. For this study, 
the standardized beta coefficient was -.378. This value suggests a moderate contribution 
to the significance of this test. This variable was insignificant in all three elections. The 
standardized beta coefficient is surprising. Political scientists have argued that more 
permissive electoral systems result in more political parties but this finding would 
suggest the opposite. The beta coefficient implies that larger assemblies lead to fewer 
institutionalized parties and vice-a-versa. While I cannot propose any accurate 
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explanations as to why this relationship is negative, I believe this would be an interesting 
topic for future research. 
The final variable used in this test was legal threshold. This variable was also 
insignificant in all three elections. This variable had a negative beta value of -.198. The 
results here support the findings of other scholars who have argued that permissive 
electoral systems lead to more political parties. Lower thresholds make it easier for 
parties to gain representation, thus the number of parties increase when the legal 
threshold decreases. The beta coefficient here suggests that the number of 
institutionalized parties increase as the legal threshold decreases. On the other hand, as 
the legal threshold increases then the number of developed parties decrease. However, 
without statistical significance my findings are limited. 
Results in the third test prove an even stronger relationship than the previous test. 
The overall R2 value for the final model was -.251. This final test was void of any 
significant variables. The adjusted R2 decreased slightly from the previous test, and in 
both of the final tests the model R2 was negative. Thus, the overall findings of this 
chapter suggest that electoral systems have a minimal impact on party institutionalization. 
Therefore, this study supports the idea that the connection between electoral systems and 
the number of institutionalized parties is weak. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to add to the debate on electoral systems through a 
combination of major variables that have been used in past research. The results from the 
first test reject the notion that any of these variables influence party development. 
However, the second test has a high adjusted R2, but no variables that reach levels of 
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significance. From the third test, it seems that the significance increased and this time a 
few variables were statistically significant. 
This chapter has tested many ideas that researchers have used in previous 
research, but the study is different for a number of reasons. Most studies on political 
parties examine the number of parties and how independent variables cause either an 
increase (e.g., by lower legal thresholds or larger assembly sizes) or decrease (e.g., in the 
number of political parties. Other studies have focused on parties in an individual state 
(Agh 2000). There are fewer studies like this that examine the number of 
institutionalized parties in a system (Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994 and Moser 1999). 
Still, there are several ways to improve this research, and there are a number of ideas that 
future research should examine. The number of cases in this study could be increased to 
provide a larger sample. A larger sample could more accurately show the trends in party 
institutionalization. Additional research could also examine a party's vote shares in 
consecutive elections to assess the institutionalization of particular parties. More studies 
that examine the party institutionalization within a single state can add to the research in 
this chapter and the research that has been mentioned. 
This research has tested a number of variables that relate to electoral systems. In 
general, district magnitude had little effect on party institutionalization. The final two 
tests did show an increase in significance, but in general this variable had a modest 
impact. In the final model, legal thresholds district magnitude and assembly size were 
significant. Thus, the results here support the findings of other political scientists who 
have argued that permissive electoral systems (i.e., systems with higher district 
magnitude, larger assemblies, and lower legal thresholds) lead to more parties (Taagepera 
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and Shugart 1989; Lijphart 1994; Coppedge 1997 and Cox 1997). My findings take this 
research a step further and argue that permissive systems lead to an increase in the 
number of institutionalized parties. 
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Chapter4 
Party Institutionalization and the Impact of Macroeconomic Variables 
Introduction 
The focus of this chapter is the impact of economic variables on party 
institutionalization in East Europe. There is a lively debate as to whether economics has 
an effect on party institutionalization. Some authors have claimed that economics plays a 
minimal role in voter choice (Harper 2000) while others have argued that economics is 
very influential (Pacek 1994). The central focus of this chapter is to examine the 
relationship between party institutionalization and macroeconomic variables in East 
Europe. 
The first section of this chapter reviews some of the key issues relating to 
economic variables and party institutionalization. The second section discusses the 
methods used in the chapter. The dependent variable of party institutionalization is 
operationalized with each of the independent variables in this section. The final section 
summarizes the findings for each election year and compares these findings with previous 
research. Several authors argue that macroeconomic variables influence voter choice 
(Lewis-Beck 1986; Pacek 1994; Aguilar and Pacek 2000; Fidrmuc 2000 and Lewis-Beck 
and Paldam 2000). I hypothesize that as macroeconomic variables improve (e.g., 
unemployment rates decrease, gross domestic product (GDP) growth increases and gross 
national income (GNI) per capita increases, etc.) voters in East Europe will reward 
incumbents, and this will lead to an increase in the number of institutionalized parties. 
When macroeconomic variables suffer, I expect voters to punish incumbents and 
therefore the number of institutionalized parties should decrease. 
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Literature Review 
The impact of macroeconomic variables on the number of parties has received 
long-standing scholarly attention, but the research has only recently focused on the 
number of institutionalized parties. Research in this area has largely examined 
macroeconomic variables (i.e., variables such as unemployment rates, inflation rates, and 
GDP). As a comparative study, this chapter looks at how party institutionalization is 
affected by macroeconomic variables. 
Economic Development and Voter Turnout 
A long-standing argument has been that economic development has a negative 
relationship with voter turnout (Aguilar and Pacek 2000; Millard 1992; Troxel 1993 and 
Pacek 1994). Aguilar and Pacek (2000) find that "voters in developing countries are 
sensitive to economic conditions" (1005). In their comparative study of Latin American 
countries they find that voter turnout increases as the economy falters, and subsequently, 
this increase in turnout typically results in penalty votes, or votes that punish the party or 
parties in power. Their study, while not explicitly focused on party institutionalization, 
does have implications for this chapter. When economic decline occurs and voter turnout 
increases, the anticipated result is incumbent defeat. During economic growth, ort the 
other hand, voter turnout should remain at a constant level and incumbents should receive 
support from voters. 
Following Aguilar and Pacek' s (2000) argument, if voters punish the incumbents 
responsible for economic decline, then it will be more difficult for parties to become 
institutionalized. During economic downturns, voter turnout often increases because 
voters grow frustrated with the current government's economic policies. With this 
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increase in voter turnout, the number of votes an incumbent receives decreases. 
Furthermore, in times of prolonged economic stagnation or economic decline the careers 
of incumbents and most elected officials will be much shorter than during times of 
economic growth. When incumbents do not win re-election, the livelihood of their 
parties suffer. As the strength of a party is eroded by economic troubles, it becomes more 
difficult for parties to institutionalize. Therefore, as the economy declines, voter turnout 
and the number of votes penalizing incumbents will increase thereby complicating the 
institutionalization process and limiting the number of institutionalized parties. 
In his study of Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Poland, Pacek (1994) 
uses unemployment rates, real income levels, and inflation rates to examine economic 
strength. In later work, Aguilar and Pacek (2000) omit inflation rates because they can 
increase while other variables-unemployment rates and real income-in a country 
improve. Still, in this study the authors' results indicate that as unemployment rates 
increase so does voter turnout (2000). Therefore, Aguilar and Pacek's (2000) findings 
support the notion that voters in East European are concerned with macroeconomic 
variables, and if these variables take a turn for the worse so does the future of 
incumbents. 
However, Hamann (2000), Harper (2000), and Roper (2003) suggest that 
economic variables do not have the degree of influence that other authors find (Pacek 
1994; Aguilar and Pacek 2000; Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000). For example, Hamann 
(2000) concludes from her study on the Spanish Socialist Party (SPOE) that Spanish 
voters are more concerned with their ideology than their economy. Despite high 
unemployment rates from the mid 1980s through the mid 1990s, the SPOE was able to 
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win re-election in three elections. Because of the fragility of competing parties, Hamann 
argues that the SPOE was able to retain control over the government because of its 
disproportionate power. Only after more than a decade did the SPOE lose their control 
over the government. Therefore, these results differ from the previous findings that 
suggested poor economic performance results in electoral defeat for incumbents. 
If economic variables have had little effect on incumbent success in Spain, 
perhaps there is not such a strong relationship between economics and electoral victory. 
Or, however, perhaps the relationship between economics and electoral performance 
varies by country. Lewis-Beck (1988) finds that ideology and party identification are the 
most salient factors for voters in developed countries. Furthermore, developed states 
such as the United States and Great Britain typically have institutionalized political 
parties, and developing countries usually do not. Therefore, I argue that as a country 
becomes more developed economically the institutionalization of its political parties 
increases as well. Post-communist countries should experience volatility in the 
institutionalization of parties, especially with respect to economic development. On the 
other hand, established democracies should have a number of institutionalized parties that 
may gain (lose) representation depending on the success (failure) of the economy. The 
difference, however, is that when parties in post-communist countries lose representation 
there is a possibility that the party may eventually disappear. Meanwhile, established 
democracies may experience fluctuations in party representation, but the parties in these 
countries should continue to exist unlike parties in post-communist countries. 
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Retrospective and Prospective Voting 
Using retrospective and prospective voting is a common method used by political 
scientists. Harper (2000) finds mixed results for the relationship between economic 
performance and electoral success. He examines how voters reward or punish 
incumbents with respect to economic variables. Retrospective voting occurs when a 
voter uses the past few years as the determining factor in deciding who to vote for. 
Harper argues that voters use retrospective pocketbook voting which is when voters 
reward incumbents if an individual's pocketbook is sufficient, or punish incumbents if an 
individual's pocketbook is lower than they believe it should be. The final strategy is 
sociotropic voting. Sociotropic voting occurs when voters are more concerned with 
national issues more than individual egocentric issues (Mughan and Lacy 2002). 
One approach voters use is prospective voting and this approach focuses on the 
policies of a party. If a voter agrees with a candidate's policies then they will vote for 
that candidate. Prospective voting occurs when a voter supports a candidate for his/her 
policies. If a voter disagrees with the policies, then he/she will not vote for the candidate. 
Under prospective voting the voters care more about the policies of a candidate while 
retrospective voters focus on the results from an incumbent's performance (Roper 2003). 
Harper (2000) and Roper (2003) find that economics plays only a limited role in voting 
behavior. Thus, the mixed statistical results suggest that maybe other factors, besides 
economics, are at work. Some scholars refute the claim that economics plays a role in 
voter attitudes, and it follows that if voters do not rely on economics to influence their 
vote, then maybe parties experience some degree of political insulation from economic 
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woes. It is very possible that other factors such as ethnicity and historical legacies may 
continue to influence voters irrespective of economic conditions. 
Lewis-Beck and Paldam (2000) provide an overview of contemporary research on 
economic influence on politics. The authors argue that economics does matter, and 
voters reward incumbents when the economy is strong and punish them when the 
economy weakens. They make an interesting modification to their findings. Lewis-Beck 
and Paldam suggest that economics is a determining factor for voters, but the salience of 
economics is not static; rather, the importance of economics changes from election to 
election. In some elections, economics could be a primary factor in voter selection 
whereas in other elections economics may play more of a secondary role. These findings 
would help explain the success the SPOE in Hamann's work. Still, Lewis-Beck and 
Paldam argue that if an economy struggles long enough voters will punish incumbents. 
This punishment will retard the development of established parties. 
Parties and Economic Policies 
Fidrmuc's (2000) work also deals with retrospective voting and its presence in 
East Europe. He argues that voters will respond positively when they have been the 
beneficiary of economic reform and negatively when they have suffered from economic 
reform. Fidrmuc states that white collar workers and economic elites typify the voters 
who benefit most from economic reform while blue-collar workers do not enjoy the same 
benefits from economic reform. Thus, different voters are concerned with different 
issues. Aguilar and Pacek (2000) similarly argue that blue-collar middle-income citizens 
are usually adversely affected by economic reform, and these individuals tend to punish 
incumbents. Therefore, Fidrmuc's (2000) and Aguilar and Pacek's (2000) findings 
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suggest that parties that can attract middle class citizens should be the most electorally 
successful parties in times of economic distress. In other words, when the economy is 
bad, the parties that can gather the most support from blue-collar workers and middle-
income citizens should gain the most representation. It follows then, that economic 
distress should help certain parties (i.e., parties associated with blue-collar workers and/or 
middle-income citizens) become institutionalized. 
Methodology 
As discussed in earlier chapters, the dependent variable in this study is the number 
of institutionalized parties in East European countries. I look at this variable in elections 
during three different time periods. The first test uses data from elections between 1994 
. and 1996, the second test examines elections between 1997 and 1999, and the final test is 
based on elections between 2000 and 2002. 
Many scholars have investigated the constraining effects of economics on the 
number of parties-especially incumbent parties (Hamann 2000; Harper 2000 and Pacek 
1994). Gross national income (GNI) is one of the independent variables used in this 
research. If a state experiences economic difficulties and has a lower GNI, then I expect 
the number of institutionalized parties to be reduced. When GNI declines people are 
ready to punish incumbents which in tum slows party institutionalization. If a country 
has steady increases in GNI, then party institutionalization should increase. 
Another variable in this model is central government debt. My contention is that 
as a state's economy suffers, political leaders will seek external funding to minimize 
economic problems. In several cases, as the economy declines voters punish incumbents 
(Aguilar and Pacek 2000). Thus to avoid electoral defeat, officeholders will use a variety 
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of ways, including external debt, to improve their economy. I expect to find more 
institutionalized parties in cases with higher central government debt. When central 
government debt is low, I expect the number of developed parties to also be lower. To 
improve economic performance during periods of stagnation or recession, government 
often adopt a more active approach in developing monetary and fiscal policies. 
Governments may try and increase spending to improve economic conditions, and this 
can be very beneficial to an economy. More central government debt should translate 
into more economic aid, and should lead to improved economic conditions. However, 
one side effect of government spending during economic struggles is an increase of 
central government debt. As an economy struggles and central government debt is low, I 
expect incumbents to be voted out of office. If central government debt is higher during 
economic difficulties (such as high unemployment rates, low gross domestic product 
(GDP) growth and low levels of GNI per capita), then I anticipate the number of 
institutionalized parties to increase. Most of the countries in this study have not enjoyed 
considerable economic growth, and therefore I hypothesize that as the central government 
debt increases the number of institutionalized parties should increase. 
Gross domestic product growth is a common indicator for economic strength and 
is used in this study. As countries and economies develop, GDP growth should increase. 
Under sociotropic voting citizens of a country may be more concerned with variables like 
GDP growth and GNI per capita. Even though this variable may not be as influential to 
voters as variables like unemployment rates, GDP growth does broadly measure a 
country's economic growth. I could use GDP rates to test this variable's significance but 
some countries have larger economies like Poland, while other countries have much 
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smaller GDP levels like Estonia. In this chapter, I use GDP growth which calculates the 
rate of growth in GDP from year to year. Sustained increases in GDP growth indicate 
economic progress and I anticipate consistent growth to lead to incumbent support. 
Therefore when GDP growth is sustained, I anticipate an increase in the number of 
institutionalized parties because voters will reward incumbents for economic progress. 
During negative GDP growth, I expect the number of developed parties to decrease 
because voters will punish the parties in power. 
One of the most used variables in research such as this is the unemployment rate. 
This variable is commonly used because it is typically readily available and easy to use 
and interpret. Several scholars use unemployment rates as one way to study economic 
variables (Pacek 1994; Harper 2000; Hamann 2000; Fidrmuc 2000 and Roper 2003). 
While there can be regional variations, I believe that unemployment rates are a concern to 
the majority of the population, and thus this variable should be influential in the electoral 
success of political parties. If unemployment rates increase, then I expect voter turnout to 
increase. Further, when unemployment rates increase, I argue that those who vote will 
punish incumbents for the high unemployment rates. On the other hand, I expect low 
unemployment rates to translate into re-election victories for incumbents. In sum, as 
unemployment rates increase the institutionalization of political parties should decrease 
and when unemployment rates decline I expect the number of institutionalized parties to 
increase. 
Findings and Discussion 
In this chapter, I use stepwise ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to test for 
significance between economic variables and party institutionalization. With this test, I 
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examine which variables are significant and offer explanations as to why certain variables 
are significant. The first test examines economic variables and the parliamentary 
elections between 1994 and 1996. In most of the countries, this election is either the 
second or third democratic election to be held. Early stages in the democratization 
process are marked by parties that are still attempting to find the most effective electoral 
strategies. In the second election, between 1997 and 1999, the number of 
institutionalized parties decreased. For this final test, the number of institutionalized 
parties remained constant from the previous election. In Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and 
the Czech Republic, the number of parties was the same as the previous election. The 
individual results of each test are included in the rest of this section. 
Institutionalized Parties Between 1994and1996 
In this first test, I use OLS regression to test the significance between the number 
of institutionalized parties and the independent variables for the time period of 1994-
1996. Because this time period represents an early stage in the democratization process, I 
am not too surprised that none of the variables were significant. The following table 
reports the results from this first test. 
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Table 4.1: Institutionalized Parties and Economics between 1994-1996 
Independent Significance Standardized Beta 
Variables Coefficients 
GNI Per Capita .349 .741 
Central Government Debt .437 .536 
GDP Growth .709 -.208 
Unemployment Rate .744 -.199 
AdjustedRL .317 --
n=9 -- --
The results from the first test reveal no significant relationships. The GNI per 
capita is insignificant in this study. The standardized beta coefficient for this test was 
.741 and this reveals a positive relationship. Because of the early stage of the 
democratization process, the economic situation can complicate an incumbent' s re-
election hopes. For countries in East Europe, the post-communist period has witness 
considerable economic difficulties, especially early in this process. However, with no 
statistical significance, I am only able to speculate on why no relationship exists in this 
test. 
Central government debt was also insignificant in this test. The standardized beta 
coefficient for this variable was .536. This coefficient illustrates a positive, moderate 
contribution to the overall adjusted R2• If significant, this variable would suggest that as 
central government debt increases so do the number of developed parties. I believe the 
central government debt may be more of a factor in later elections rather than this first 
election. After political leaders in these countries have witnessed the short-lived tenure 
of their predecessors, I believe that the new leaders and new parties are searching for 
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ways to improve economic conditions. One way to improve economic conditions is to 
borrow money from an international organization, such as the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) or the World Bank (WB). 
GDP growth is the next variable in the study. This variable is an important 
indicator of economic expansion or contraction. For this variable, in this test the 
standardized beta coefficient was -.208. This value represents a limited, negative 
contribution to the relationship with institutionalized parties. The results here imply that 
as GDP growth increases the number of developed parties decreases. While this variable 
is a commonly used indicator of economic development, I do not expect average citizens 
to use this variable as a determining factor in how they vote. This variable is not used as 
much as other macroeconomic variables such as unemployment rates and real income. I 
believe people can be more affected by unemployment rates and real income levels than 
GDP growth. Therefore, I am not surprised that this variable was insignificant in this 
study. 
As stated before, unemployment rates are commonly used in political science 
research. Many scholars believe that voters in East Europe consider unemployment rates 
when they vote. In this first test, the standardized beta coefficient was -.199 which 
indicates a negative, weak relationship. Since this election occurred early in the 
democratization, I believe that unemployment rates were insignificant because citizens 
were not experiencing similar unemployment rates in every country. For example, 
Poland, Slovakia, and Bulgaria all had unemployment rates over 15% while the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, and Latvia all had rates approximately half of that of the former 
countries. Thus, the countries in this study have had different levels of unemployment. 
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The adjusted R2 for this test was .317. This model indicates a weak relationship 
between the institutionalized parties and the independent variables. Therefore, these 
results imply that economic variables have a limited impact on party institutionalization 
between 1994-1996. With these results, I am unable to come to any definite conclusions 
about the variables in this chapter. Since the elections in this study occurred early in the 
democratization process, I believe voters are not sufficiently frustrated with the economic 
conditions in East Europe. As such I hypothesize that as political learning increases, the 
influence of economic variables on party development will increase. 
Party Institutionalization Between 1997and1999 
In this second test, I expect economic conditions to have a greater impact on party 
institutionalization. As political learning increases, voters develop strategies and adapt to 
the political system. Voters will be more likely to punish incumbents who are viewed to 
be responsible for economic troubles. Furthermore, I expect economic variables to 
become more important to voters as the democratization process continues. Additionally, 
voters will be more anxious to see improvements in macroeconomic conditions like 
unemployment rates. The following tests party development between 1997 and 1999 
with the same macroeconomic variables used in the previous test. 
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Table 4.2: Institutionalized Parties and Economics between 1997-1999 
Independent Significance Standardized Beta 
Variables Coefficients 
GNI Per Capita .038* .695* 
Central Government Debt .502 -.204 
GDP Growth .061 -.494 
Unemployment Rate .508 -.204 
AdjustedR"' .408 --
n=9 -- --
*p<.05 
GNI per capita was insignificant in the previous election; however, the results in 
the second test were different. In the second election, GNI per capita was statistically 
significant. The standardized beta coefficient for the variable was .695 which reveals a 
strong, positive relationship. In other words, as the GNI per capita increases so does the 
number of institutionalized parties. On the other hand, a decrease in GNI per capita 
would likely lead to a decrease in the number of institutionalized parties. The 
relationship here reveals that as GNI per capita increases so do the number of 
institutionalized parties. This finding suggests that sociotropic or macroeconomic 
variables may be salient to voters. 
Central government debt was again insignificant in the second test. This variable 
had a standardized beta coefficient of -.204, which shows a weak, negative relationship. 
While this variable was insignificant in two consecutive elections, I find this result 
surprising since the economies in the region have not made substantial economic gains. 
If central government debt is relatively low and the economies for these countries are still 
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experiencing modest economic growth, then it is unlikely that this variable has much of 
an effect on the dependent variable. 
The next variable, GDP growth fell just short of statistical significance in the 
second test. The standardized beta coefficient for GDP growth in the second test was 
-.494. This value is moderately strong and negative. Therefore, as the GDP growth 
increases the number of developed parties decreases. The explanation for this 
relationship is unclear, but without statistical significance the relationship between this 
variable and dependent variable lacks salience in this test. 
Unemployment rates are the next variable reported in this test. This variable 
lacked significance in both tests. A significant relationship between the dependent 
variable and unemployment was not present, and the standardized beta coefficient was 
only -.204. The absence of statistical significance is surprising since many authors have 
found this variable to be significant in earlier studies. It is possible that citizens in the 
sample countries have not punished incumbents for unemployment rates because the rates 
are not high enough to cause voter frustration. If unemployment rates continue to 
increase and hurt enough voters, then I expect this variable to have more of an impact on 
party development. Another plausible explanation is that unemployment rates are over-
reported and are misleading. If a smaller percentage of citizens are affected by 
unemployment rates, then maybe this group is not large enough to punish incumbents. 
Therefore, those who are in office retain their positions because unemployment rates are 
at an acceptable level for the populace. 
The adjusted R2 in the first test was relatively low with a value of .317. For the 
second test, the adjusted R2 increased to .408. With this increase, the model can explain 
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party institutionalization by almost 10% more than the previous test. Most of this 
increase can be attributed to the increase of significance in the GNI per capita and GDP 
growth. While the latter variable is still just short of significance, its increase must have 
some effect on the overall significance. Again, the significance of GNI per capita clearly 
has an impact on the increase in the adjusted R2• The variables used in this test revealed a 
moderately strong relationship, and this trend continues in the final test. 
Party Institutionalization Between 2000 and 2002 
For the final years between 2000 and 2002, I test the variables once more. In this 
test, I use data from the most current elections. Results from the first test revealed no 
significant variables, and in the second test only GNI per capita was significant. In this 
final test, GNI per capita, GDP growth, and central government debt continue to increase 
in significance, and a third variable also emerges as statistically significant. 
Table 4.3: Institutionalized Parties and Economics between 2000-2002 
Independent Significance Standardized Beta 
Variables Coefficients 
GNI Per Capita .004** .618 
Central Government Debt .001 *** -.754 
GDP Growth .047* -.341 
Unemployment Rate .570 -.106 
Adjusted R2 .907 --
n=9 -- --
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
In the previous test, GNI per capita was the only significant value. Once again, 
GNI per capita was significant but this time at the 99% level. This is the second 
consecutive test in which this variable has reached significance. The standardized beta 
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coefficient for GNI per capita was .618 and this value represents a strong, positive 
contribution to the adjusted R2. The beta value for this variable decreased but only 
slightly. GNI per capita continues to have a strong, positive relationship on the 
dependent variable. Results from this test suggest that as the GNI per capita increases so 
do the number of developed parties. With statistical significance in two consecutive 
elections, the results here indicate that this variable could play an influential role in party 
development. I believe increases in GNI per capita satisfy the needs of voters and 
therefore voters reward incumbents through re-election victories. GNI per capita 
measures a country's wealth per capita, and if wealth among the populace increases then 
the livelihood of a country should be better and voters should be content with those in the 
legislature. By rewarding incumbents, it is more likely for parties to remain in power 
rather than being voted out of office if the GNI per capita decreased. 
Central government debt is the next variable used in this study. Much like 
unemployment rates, this variable has been insignificant in the previous tests. In this 
final test, however, this variable reached significance with a value of .001. The 
standardized beta coefficient for central government debt was -.754. The beta coefficient 
in this test reveals a negative relationship between central government debt and party 
development. Therefore, as central government debt increases the number of 
institutionalized parties decreases. Because this variable was significant in only the final 
test, it is difficult to determine why this variable is significant. One explanation could be 
that as the amount borrowed by the government increases, the more the economy 
improves. If the economy improves then voters are less likely to remove incumbents 
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from office. Subsequently, parties retain seats and are able to develop into 
institutionalized parties. 
For the final test, GDP growth was significant at the .05 level. GDP growth had a 
standardized beta coefficient of -.341, which shows a moderately strong, negative 
relationship with the dependent variable. These results suggest that when the GDP 
growth decreases the number of institutionalized parties increase. I expected the number 
of parties to increase when GDP growth increases because if economic conditions are 
improving, voters will reward incumbents. It is also likely that as GDP continues to 
grow, parties in power will gain power and more representation. When the parties in 
power enjoy favorable economic conditions, the size of the party in parliament should 
increase as voters reward incumbents for the strength of the economy. 
Unemployment rates in the previous tests were insignificant and were in the final 
test also. Despite a number of scholars (Pacek 1994; Harper 2000; Hamann 2000 and 
Fidrmuc 2000) attesting to the statistical importance of this variable, my results differ 
from previous research. Unemployment rates were again insignificant in this final test, 
and the standardized beta coefficient was -.106. This beta coefficient indicates a weak, 
negative relationship. I am surprised to find that unemployment rates were insignificant 
in all of the tests that I ran in this chapter. To borrow from earlier explanations, I believe 
that this variable may be insignificant because unemployment rates are not high enough 
to hurt people in other elite social classes. Fidrmuc (2000) states that individuals will 
respond differently to economic conditions. For example, unemployment rates are more 
of a concern to blue collar workers than white-collar workers. Furthermore, white collar 
workers tend to have higher voter tum-out than blue collar workers, so unemployment 
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rate increases may not influence party institutionalization because of the lower voter 
turnout among blue collar workers. The few affected by unemployment may not be 
enough to punish incumbents. When enough people have jobs, then incumbents, when 
all other variables are not declining, should enjoy re-election. However, from these 
results I am unable to make any definite statements from this final test. 
The adjusted R2 for the second test had increased from the first test, and this trend 
continued in the final test. In the final test the adjusted R2 was .907. This model's 
explanatory ability represents a strong, positive relationship between the number of 
institutionalized parties and the independent variables. These results suggest that the 
macroeconomic variables used in this chapter influence party development in East 
European countries. The results show that a relationship does exist between the number 
of institutionalized parties and the independent variables used in this study. By using 
these variables, I am able to explain most of the institutionalized parties in the final test 
of this study. 
Conclusion 
The influence of economic variables on party institutionalization is mixed. Some 
authors have found a significant relationship between economics and party 
institutionalization and others have found mixed results. Only one variable was 
significant in two tests and that variable was GNI per capita. GDP growth was almost 
significant in the second test and emerged significant in the final test. Central 
government debt was also significant in the final test. For the final test, my results 
illustrate a strong relationship between the number of institutionalized parties and the 
independent variables used in the final chapter. 
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Future research on party development should focus on variables similar to this. 
At this point in time, the number of elections that have taken place in each country limit 
my findings. Parties are still developing in these countries. Institutionalized parties are 
present in more recent elections rather than early elections. Research on party 
institutionalization is very important to political research and especially to politicians in 
these countries. If politicians find that certain economic variables are more important 
than others, incumbents may try and improve certain economic conditions, such as GNI 
per capita, to gain re-election. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions and Future Research on Party Institutionalization 
Introduction 
The previous chapters have covered a number of different variables. Each 
individual chapter has examined a broad theme (whether it was ethnicity, electoral 
systems, or economics) and studied the impact these factors have on party 
institutionalization. My central focus has been to examine which factors have a greater 
impact on party institutionalization. This chapter summarizes the general findings from 
earlier chapters and provides some final thoughts on party institutionalization in East 
Europe. 
East Europe has been the subject of many studies for political scientists. The 
democratization process, especially, has received considerable attention from scholars. A 
number of scholars have studied the impact of certain variables on parties in post-
communist countries. Ethnicity, electoral systems, and economic strength have all been 
included in studies on political parties. The goal of this thesis is to examine the impact of 
different variables on party institutionalization. In chapter two, I assess the relationship 
between ethnicity and party institutionalization. Chapter three evaluates the impact of 
electoral systems on the number of institutionalized parties. Chapter four examines the 
influence economic variables have on the number of institutionalized parties in East 
Europe. 
Chapter two tested variables related to ethnicity to assess the relationship between 
ethnicity and party institutionalization. Results from chapter two indicate no significant 
relationship between ethnicity and the number of institutionalized parties. The next 
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chapter focused on the impact of electoral laws on party development. The findings in 
this chapter illustrate no statistical significance between electoral systems and the number 
of institutionalized parties. In the final chapter, I examine the relationship between 
economic variables and party institutionalization. The overall findings of this thesis 
present a basic conclusion concerning parties in East Europe. Economic strength often 
leads to success for parties while economic decline often limits party institutionalization. 
The goal of this chapter is to summarize and explain the main findings in the previous 
chapters. Results from this chapter are intriguing, but future research should continue to 
examine the role economics plays in the institutionalization of political parties. 
Results of First Election ( 1994-1996) 
The first election of this study was the second democratic election in most of the 
countries. This election represents an early stage in the democratization process for these 
countries. While the results of this thesis are limited because of the short time span, I 
believe that this research can be very useful in examining early trends and providing a 
baseline in the transition to democracy. In this first election, the results in all three 
chapters suggest little statistical significance among the independent variables. 
There are several ways to operationalize the dependent variable of 
institutionalized parties. The results of studies like this can be greatly affected by the 
method used to operationalize the dependent variable. I use the method employed by 
Ordeshook and Shvetsova (1994) which considers institutionalized parties to be 
represented in consecutive elections. As previously discussed, I employ this method 
because it effectively determines the number of institutionalized parties. 
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For the second chapter, I tested the relationship between institutionalized parties 
and variables associated with ethnicity. My findings indicate that the number of ethnic 
groups plays a limited role in party development. However, the presence of an official 
state language was statistically significant. My findings suggest that states with an 
official language experience fewer institutionalized parties while states with no official 
language usually have more institutionalized parties in this time period. As Kitschelt 
(1992) argues once democracy has been implemented in a country, ethnic cleavages can 
be very influential for voters in early elections. In many of these countries, the elections 
studied in this time period represent either the first or the second democratic election. 
Further, variables associated with ethnicity such as language played a role in the 
development of parties in these countries. While I do not believe that an official state 
language is one of the most important overall variables in party development between 
1994 and 1996, I do think these findings highlight an important discovery. The results of 
chapter two suggest that ethnicity has a minimal impact on the institutionalization of 
parties in East Europe. 
In chapters three and four, electoral laws and economic variables were studied 
respectively. None of the independent variables in chapters three or four were 
statistically significant in the first election. I believe that electoral laws were insignificant 
in elections between 1994 and 1996 because the impact of electoral laws is not immediate 
and the effects associated with electoral systems will occur in subsequent elections. 
Much of the literature on electoral Jaws argues that decreases in district magnitude, 
assembly size, and increased legal thresholds restrict the number of parties in an election. 
While at first glance this seems to be the case, a closer look reveals that only two or three 
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parties have participated in all three of the elections used in this study. Therefore, some 
other factors must be at work to limit the number of institutionalized parties because 
electoral laws have played a very small role in the early development of parties in East 
Europe. 
The focus of chapter four is to examine the impact of economic variables on party 
development. The results from the regression analysis reveal that none of the 
independent variables have a statistically significant relationship with the dependent 
variable. Because this election took place early in the democratization process, and since 
none of the countries had experienced substantial economic growth, voters in East 
European countries were still developing voting preferences. Thus, the impact of the 
economy on party institutionalization is limited in this first election, but is statistically 
significant in later studies. 
Results of the Second Election ( 1997-1999) 
In the second set of elections, the results were much different. For chapter two, 
neither of the two variables were significant (So while an official state language led to 
fewer institutionalized parties in the first election). This variable had little to no effect in 
the second round of elections. The number of ethnic groups in these countries was again 
statistically insignificant. From these results, I deduce that ethnicity plays a minor role in 
early elections, but in later elections becomes even less significant. This finding accords 
well with Kitschelt' s (1992) contention that as a country becomes more democratic, 
voters look outside of their ethnicity to guide their ballot selection. Therefore, other 
variables should become more significant while ethnic variables lose their salience. 
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In the previous elections, electoral laws played no role in the development of 
parties. For this second test, the results indicate that electoral laws again do not play a 
significant role in party formation. As previously stated, electoral laws will have a 
greater effect for democracies with established parties because the developed parties will 
attempt to manipulate the electoral system in their favor. Because the countries in this 
study are still relatively new democracies, only a few institutionalized parties exist in 
East Europe. 
For chapter four in the first test, none of the economic independent variables were 
statistically significant. The results in the second test illustrate that GNI per capita was 
statistically significant. Even though other economic variables were insignificant, the 
impact of this economic variable shows a positive relationship between GNI per capita 
and the number of institutionalized parties. These results suggest that an increase in GNI 
per capita results in an increase in the number of institutionalized parties. I believe that 
voters in these countries develop tendencies and expectations of their elected officials. 
As an economy grows, the likelihood of an incumbent winning re-election improves. 
When incumbents win re-election parties become institutionalized. Therefore, my 
findings here suggest that GNI per capita increases lead to an increase in the number of 
institutionalized parties. 
Results of Final Election (2000-2002) 
Data in this last series of tests represent the most current elections. For most of 
the countries in this study, this is the third or fourth democratic election. The results of 
this test provide one clear trend: Macroeconomic variables do influence voters in later 
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elections in East Europe. In the rest of this section, I elaborate the explanations for this 
trend, and offer some predictions for the future of institutionalized parties in East Europe. 
For chapter two, the results of the final ethnicity test again shows no statistical 
significance for official state languages and number of ethnic groups. The number of 
ethnic groups was insignificant in both cases, and it was insignificant in the final test 
also. Therefore, this variable plays little to no role in current party development in these 
countries. The relationship between official state language and the number of 
institutionalized parties was significant in the first election, but not in later elections. I 
believe this indicates that in early elections, voters look to basic values to influence their 
votes (e.g., ethnic and social cleavages and anti-communist sentiment). However as 
democracies progress, voters develop preferences on various social issues and the 
previous voting preferences (ethnic cleavages) are replaced. Thus, I am not very 
surprised that this trend emerged from my tests. 
Electoral laws have received considerable research from political scientists 
(Duverger 1954; Lijphart 1994; Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994; Cox 1997; Moser 1999 
and McFaul 2001). Many scholars have affirmed the significance of these variables in 
studies on parties. From my results, I have found no evidence to either reject or support 
the conclusions drawn from the previous research. In the final test, none of the 
independent variables in chapter three were statistically significant. As mentioned 
earlier, I attribute the absence of statistical significance to the inexperience of parties, 
politicians and voters in these countries. For experienced democracies, I would expect 
that parties in power would modify electoral laws to their advantage and that these parties 
would manipulate the system to their advantage. In the case of post-communist East 
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European countries, however, the reasons incumbents have not been able to change the 
electoral laws for their advantage is possibly because only a limited number of parties 
have been institutionalized. Additionally without incumbents winning re-election, it is 
very difficult for these parties to change electoral laws for their benefit. Furthermore, the 
nature of coalition formation in these countries might also restrict the abilities of political 
parties to change electoral procedures. This position is beyond the scope of this research 
but is an interesting question to explore in future research. 
The final substantive chapter examines the influence of macroeconomic variables 
on party development. In the first test (1994-1996), none of the economic variables were 
statistically significant. The results from elections between 1997-1999 suggest that GNI 
per capita has an impact on the number of institutionalized parties, and GDP growth was 
just short of statistical significance. In the final test, the impact of economic variables 
was much stronger than it was in previous tests. For example, GNI per capita in the final 
test was significant at the 99% level. 
Results from the second test indicate that GDP growth was almost statistically 
significant, and in the final test the variable was significant. However, the standardized 
beta coefficient was negative which indicates that GDP growth increases should lead to 
decreases in the number of institutionalized parties. Upon sustained economic growth, 
the party or parties in power will continue to gain membership until the economy falters. 
I expected the number of institutionalized parties to increase when GDP growth increases 
because if economic conditions are improving, voters will reward incumbents. It is also 
likely that as GDP continues to grow, parties in power will gain power and more 
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representation. When the parties in power enjoy favorable economic conditions, the size 
of the party should increase as voters reward incumbents for the strength of the economy. 
One surprising finding was the impact of central government debt on party 
development. This variable was insignificant in previous studies, but was significant in 
this final test. I argue that central government debt is a tool used by incumbents to 
stimulate an economy. If parties increase the central government's debt, however, then 
the economy must be either stagnant or declining. The results from this study report a 
negative standardized beta coefficient; therefore, an increase in central government debt 
translates into fewer institutionalized parties. I believe this negative relationship exists 
because government debt normally increases as economic troubles occur. In addition, if 
central government debt increases as a result of economic decline then I expect the 
number of institutionalized parties to decrease. To reiterate, government debt usually 
increases when the economy is struggling. Thus when the economy declines, I expect 
incumbents and parties to experience considerable difficulty maintaining legislative 
control. Furthermore, if incumbents and parties do not win re-election in consecutive 
elections it is impossible for parties to develop. 
The final variable tested in chapter four was unemployment rates. This variable 
was statistically insignificant in every test run in this chapter. In a number of other 
countries, especially in the United States, unemployment rates are very important to 
voters. However, my results suggest that no relationship exists between unemployment 
rates and institutionalized parties in East Europe. While this variable may become more 
important to voters in future elections, the findings here show that unemployment rates 
do not influence the number of institutionalized parties for the countries in this study. 
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My results support the findings of other political scientists (Hamann 2000 and Roper 
2003). For example, in her study of the Spanish electorate, Hamann finds that increasing 
unemployment rates did not translate into electoral defeat for the Spanish Socialist Party 
(SPOE). I suspect that eventually unemployment rate increases will cause voters to 
punish incumbents, which should retard the development of institutionalized parties in 
East Europe. 
Final Thoughts 
Party institutionalization has received considerably less attention from political 
scientists than other areas of research. In studies on the number of parties, they neglect 
the importance of institutionalized parties in stable democracies. This study has tested a 
number of different variables to evaluate which factors most influence party development 
in East Europe. The results from this thesis come to one conclusion: economic variables 
have a significant impact in the number of institutionalized parties in East Europe. Even 
though results from the first election were insignificant, findings from later elections 
demonstrate the importance of the economy. This result should not be surprising. Lewis-
Beck and Paldam (2000) argue that voters are very concerned with their "pocketbooks" 
and use economic strength to either punish or reward incumbents. In times of economic 
strength, incumbents are rewarded while they are punished during economic downturns. 
I believe this study has bridged a gap between studies on the number of parties in post-
communist countries and research on the role of institutionalized parties. 
Future studies would add to the validity of this study by using more elections. 
Over the course of three elections, it is hard to infer much from the data available. With 
only three elections, I am able to provide more of a snap-shot rather than the complete 
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picture of party development. Since only three or four democratic elections have taken 
place in post-communist East Europe, the long-term effects of electoral and other 
economic variables may be different in future elections. In addition, the number of 
institutionalized parties may increase (decrease) as economic development continues 
(regresses). Regardless, party institutionalization warrants additional attention from 
political scientists. As long as there are developing democracies there will be a need for 
research on party development and institutionalization. 
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